Nigeria: the challenge of “Boko Haram II”

The radical Islamist group Boko Haram poses an increasing threat to the Nigerian state in the country’s north. How has it become so powerful and effective? The ingredients of an answer lie in the complex history, power-relationships and social inequalities of this marginalised region, says Morten Bøås. The tradition of Islamic radicalism that exists in northern Nigeria has mainly been non-worldly: the advocacy of a purer way of Islamic life. This changed at the turn of the millennium with the emergence of so-called “Taliban” groups. They both had a more coherent worldview (which sought the establishment of an Islamic government in Nigeria) and were willing to use violence to further their objectives. These groups were crushed by the Nigerian state in 2004, but Boko Haram - which had been established in 2002, and which the government saw as an unthreatening religious organisation - continued to exist. After the group turned violent, its original leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was arrested and killed in 2009. At the time this was seen as having put an end to the organisation, but this proved not to be the case. Boko Haram has re-emerged from the ashes of the death of its original leader as an avant-garde organisation embracing the strategy of hyper-violent, spectacular and deadly terrorist attacks. The question is how this could happen. The marginalisation of northern Nigeria within the context of the country as a whole, and the inequality between the north and south of Nigeria and how this may have alienated some northerners, must be taken into consideration as part

of the answer. This article, however, seeks also to place Boko Haram into a broader context, by exploring three factors: * historical forces leading to its emergence * issues concerning internal collusion between Boko Haram activists and well-connected Nigerian “big men” * external support for the organisation through emerging Af- rican jihadist networks. A movement reborn The long tradition of Islamic radicalism in northern Nigeria notwithstanding, actual organised armed struggle against the state is new. It first appeared around 2002, though the nature of the multiple bomb-attacks in Kano on 25 December 2011 (targeting churches and Christian worshippers) and 20 January 2012 (targeting police stations and other government buildings) suggests that this struggle has entered a new phase. continued

Comments

[Rédigé par : BA]

Poverty must be taken into account in the genesis of Boko haram, but not poverty alone. After all if we refer regional prosperity to regional leader in power, the north should have had more prosperity than the south, having contributed in more heads of state than the south. The real problem is that the northerners do not tolerate that any other man than a northerner becomes president of Nigeria. Their move started when Obasanjo, though sympathetic to the north due to his role in the civil war, was seen as a southerner and defied on that ground. It was under Obasanjo that Boko Haram took root with northern states enroling in sharia. Now that another southerner has taken over, after the death of a northerner in office, the northerners can not bear it ; that is why Boko Haram gains momentum and became more violent...